Folio IVTERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF · TERMS APPEARING ON THE REVERSE HEREOF
Read before use Terms appearing on the reverse hereof
Root has no owner. The asset it holds does.
A protocol with no admin keys is not a position with no counterparty. These tokens are issued by Robinhood, which retains real powers over them: to pause, to burn, to block, to upgrade, and the multiplier itself. Root inherits all of it, whole. What follows is the inventory, including the articles for which there is no remedy at all.
I. Suspension of transfer
Stock.pause() is callable by any holder of TOKEN_PAUSER_ROLE, and a chain-wide pause sits above it in the issuer's access registry. While a token is paused, every transfer, approval and permit upon it reverts. Wrapping and unwrapping therefore stop, both of them, since both move the underlying. Balances and share prices remain correct and continue to track the multiplier throughout; the holder simply cannot leave until the suspension is lifted.
None, and none is wanted. A wrapper able to move a paused token would be a wrapper that had broken into it.
II. Burning from any address
adminBurn(address, uint256) destroys tokens held by an arbitrary address and, unlike the ordinary burn, functions while the token is paused. It exists so that a court order, a sanctions listing or a mis-issue can be undone. Were it ever aimed at a Root wrapper, that wrapper would cease to be fully backed and every holder within it would share the loss rateably.
None, and none is possible. Any design able to resist this would have to hold something other than the stock, at which point it is not holding the stock.
III. Downward multipliers
The call that pays a dividend is the call that performs a split, and a reverse split is the same call with a smaller number; updateMultiplier accepts any value above zero. Every wrapped balance falls with it and the vault's price per share falls in the same block. A one-for-four consolidation quarters both.
This is correct behaviour rather than a failure. The shares really did consolidate, and a vault that declined to show it would be the one lying.
IV. Upgrade of the underlying
Each ticker is a beacon proxy over one shared implementation. Whoever controls the beacon may replace the logic behind all of them at once. Root reads uiMultiplier() and calls transfer; should the meaning of either change, Root's accounting changes with it, silently and without notice.
Root is immutable and cannot follow an upgrade. If the semantics move, the correct action is to unwrap, which requires no permission from us because there is no us.
V. Blocked addresses
Transfers carry onlyNotBlocked upon sender, recipient and caller alike, checked against a registry the issuer controls. A blocked holder can neither wrap nor unwrap. Were a wrapper itself listed, that ticker's vault would be frozen for everyone within it.
None. Set down here so that it is not a surprise later.
VI. Rounding
A rebasing balance is a division, and every conversion floors. A transfer of x may deliver x − 1, and a deposit credits what arrived rather than what was asked for. previewDeposit may therefore overstate by a single wei, which the standard permits, and withdrawal dust remains in the vault to the account of those still in it.
Deliberate, and always in the conservative direction: rounding never mints a unit nobody paid for. Crediting the requested figure is how a vault leaks to whoever deposits most often.
VII. No audit
Four contracts, no owner, no upgrade path and no fee switch, covered by a unit suite and a fork suite that runs against the live Apple token. That is not the same thing as an audit and nothing on this document pretends otherwise. An error in the wrapper's share arithmetic would be permanent, there being no admin to pause it and no proxy to patch it.
The immutability that makes it trustworthy is the property that makes a mistake final. Size the position against that and not against the prose.
VIII. The chain
Robinhood Chain is an Arbitrum Orbit rollup with a single sequencer, and its public endpoints rate-limit hard enough that this document reads them server-side, once a minute, on the reader's behalf. Sequencer downtime stops deposits and exits as it stops everything else.
Ordinary rollup risk, stated rather than skipped.
Root is not affiliated with Robinhood Markets, Inc. Nothing in this document is an offer, a recommendation or advice. The contracts are unaudited and hold assets a third party can freeze.